From iterated revision to iterated contraction: extending the Harper Identity by Booth, Richard & Chandler, Jake
This is an Open Access document downloaded from ORCA, Cardiff University's institutional
repository: http://orca.cf.ac.uk/125889/
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted to / accepted for publication.
Citation for final published version:
Booth, Richard and Chandler, Jake 2019. From iterated revision to iterated contraction: Extending
the Harper Identity. Artificial Intelligence 277 , 103171. 10.1016/j.artint.2019.103171 file 
Publishers page: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2019.103171
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2019.103171>
Please note: 
Changes made as a result of publishing processes such as copy-editing, formatting and page
numbers may not be reflected in this version. For the definitive version of this publication, please
refer to the published source. You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite
this paper.
This version is being made available in accordance with publisher policies. See 
http://orca.cf.ac.uk/policies.html for usage policies. Copyright and moral rights for publications
made available in ORCA are retained by the copyright holders.
From Iterated Revision to Iterated Contraction:
Extending the Harper Identity∗
Richard Booth
Cardiff University
Jake Chandler
La Trobe University
Abstract
The study of iterated belief change has principally focused on revision, with the
other main operator of AGM belief change theory, namely contraction, receiving
comparatively little attention. In this paper we show how principles of iterated
revision can be carried over to iterated contraction by generalising a principle
known as the ‘Harper Identity’. The Harper Identity provides a recipe for
defining the belief set resulting from contraction by a sentence A in terms of
(i) the initial belief set and (ii) the belief set resulting from revision by ¬A.
Here, we look at ways to similarly define the conditional belief set resulting
from contraction by A. After noting that the most straightforward proposal of
this kind leads to triviality, we characterise a promising family of alternative
suggestions that avoid such a result. One member of that family, which involves
the operation of rational closure, is noted to be particularly theoretically fruitful
and normatively appealing.
Keywords: belief revision, iterated belief change, belief contraction, Harper
Identity, rational closure
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1. Introduction
Since the publication of Darwiche and Pearl’s seminal paper on the problem
of iterated belief revision—the problem of how to adjust one’s corpus of beliefs in
response to a sequence of successive additions to its members—in the mid 1990’s
[2], a substantial body of research has accumulated on the topic [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8].
In contrast, work on the parallel problem of iterated contraction—the problem
of how to adjust that corpus in response to a sequence of successive retractions—
was only initiated far more recently and remains comparatively underdeveloped
[9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15].
One obvious way to level out this discrepancy would be to introduce a princi-
ple that enables us to derive, from constraints on iterated revision, correspond-
ing constraints on iterated contraction. But while there exists a well known
and widely accepted identity connecting single-shot revision and contraction,
the ‘Harper Identity’ [16], there has been no discussion to date of how to extend
this principle to the iterated case.2
The Harper Identity states that the posterior belief set resulting from con-
tracting sentence A should be formed by combining (i) the prior belief set and
(ii) the posterior belief set resulting from revision by ¬A. Moving to the iterated
case, we want to consider whether or not an analogous treatment can be given
of an agent’s conditional belief set after contraction by A, a set that captures
the beliefs that he or she would have after any subsequent revision or contrac-
tion. In other words, we are looking for ways to define the conditional belief set
resulting from contracting A in terms of (iii) the prior conditional belief set, and
(iv) the posterior conditional belief set resulting from revision by ¬A. It will
prove convenient to carry out this exercise by exploiting the well-known repre-
sentability of conditional belief sets by total preorders over the set of possible
2It should be noted that [12] and [14] do propose a principle that they call the ‘New
Harper Identity’. But while this may be suggestive of an attempted extension of the Harper
Identity to the iterated case, the New Harper Identity simply appears to be a representation,
in terms of plausibility orderings, of a particular set of postulates for iterated contraction.
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worlds. Seen through this lens, our task will amount to finding an appropriate
procedure for combining a pair of total preorders.
The plan of the remainder of this paper is as follows. We first introduce
some basic terminology and definitions (Section 2). We then show that the
simplest extension of the Harper Identity to iterated belief change is too strong,
being inconsistent, on pains of triviality, with basic principles of belief dynam-
ics (Section 3). Next, we sketch out an alternative proposal (Section 4). We
propose a pair of weak upper and lower bound principles, which we ultimately
show to characterise, in our functional domain of interest, a family of binary
combination operators for plausibility orderings that we call TeamQueue (TQ)
combinators (Subsection 4.1). We show that the addition of a further princi-
ple of ‘Parity’, singles out a particularly noteworthy TQ combinator that we
call the Synchronous TeamQueue (STQ) combinator. Indeed, extending the
Harper Identity via the STQ method turns out to yield the ‘flattest’ plausibility
ordering that is consistent with the strict plausibility inequalities common to
both inputs. Equivalently: the conditional belief set obtained by this method
corresponds to the rational closure [17] of the set of conditional beliefs com-
mon to both inputs (Subsection 4.2). Finally, we illustrate the usefulness of
the TQ approach by establishing some correspondences between principles of
iterated revision and iterated contraction (Section 5). First, we show that any
TQ combinator whatsoever can be used to recover a number of recently dis-
cussed postulates for iterated contraction from the Darwiche-Pearl postulates
for iterated revision (Subsection 5.1). Second, we show that the STQ combina-
tor allows us to derive counterparts for contraction of the best known revision
operators in the literature (Subsection 5.1). We then briefly conclude and men-
tion some ideas for future work (Section 6). In order to improve readability,
proofs of the fairly significant number of propositions and theorems have been
relegated to the appendix.
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2. Preliminaries
We represent the beliefs of an agent by a so-called belief state Ψ, which, for
the purposes of the present paper, can be treated as a primitive. The state Ψ
determines a belief set [Ψ], a deductively closed set of sentences, drawn from a
finitely generated propositional, truth-functional language L. The set of classical
logical consequences of a sentence A ∈ L is denoted by Cn(A). The set of
propositional worlds is denoted by W , and the set of models of a given sentence
A is denoted by [[A]]. We occasionally abuse notation and use x to denote
not a world but a sentence. In particular, whenever a world x appears within
the scope of a logical connective, it should be understood as referring to some
sentence whose set of models is exactly {x}. So, for example, given x, y ∈ W ,
the sentence x ∨ y is such that [[x ∨ y]] = {x, y}.
The dynamics of belief states are modelled by two operations—contraction
and revision, which respectively return the posterior belief states Ψ ∗ A and
Ψ÷A resulting from an adjustment of the prior belief state Ψ to accommodate,
respectively, the inclusion and the exclusion of A. We assume that these op-
erations satisfy the so-called AGM postulates [18], which enforce a principle of
‘minimal mutilation’ of the prior belief set in meeting the relevant exclusion or
inclusion constraint. Regarding revision, we have:
(K1∗) Cn([Ψ ∗A]) ⊆ [Ψ ∗A]
(K2∗) A ∈ [Ψ ∗A]
(K3∗) [Ψ ∗A] ⊆ Cn([Ψ] ∪ {A})
(K4∗) If ¬A /∈ [Ψ], then Cn([Ψ] ∪ {A}) ⊆ [Ψ ∗A]
(K5∗) If A is consistent, then so too is [Ψ ∗A]
(K6∗) If Cn(A) = Cn(B), then [Ψ ∗A] = [Ψ ∗B]
(K7∗) [Ψ ∗A ∧B] ⊆ Cn([Ψ ∗A] ∪ {B})
(K8∗) If ¬B /∈ [Ψ ∗A], then Cn([Ψ ∗A] ∪ {B}) ⊆ [Ψ ∗A ∧B]
Regarding contraction:
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(K1÷) Cn([Ψ÷A]) ⊆ [Ψ÷A]
(K2÷) [Ψ÷A] ⊆ [Ψ]
(K3÷) If A /∈ [Ψ], then [Ψ÷A] = [Ψ]
(K4÷) If A /∈ Cn(∅), then A /∈ [Ψ÷A]
(K5÷) If A ∈ [Ψ], then [Ψ] ⊆ Cn([Ψ÷A] ∪ {A})
(K6÷) If Cn(A) = Cn(B), then [Ψ÷A] = [Ψ÷B]
(K7÷) [Ψ÷A] ∩ [Ψ÷B] ⊆ [Ψ÷A ∧B]
(K8÷) If A /∈ [Ψ÷A ∧B], then [Ψ÷A ∧B] ⊆ [Ψ÷A]
We also assume that they are linked in the single-step case by the Harper Iden-
tity:
(HI) [Ψ÷A] = [Ψ] ∩ [Ψ ∗ ¬A]
This principle incorporates the compelling directive according to which, in giving
up A, and hence leaving open the possibility that ¬A, one ought to thereby also
retract anything that one would not have endorsed had one come to believe that
¬A. It adds to this the ‘minimal change’ requirements that (i) nothing further
is retracted and (ii) nothing is introduced either (i.e. the postulate (K2÷)).
A classic result tells us that (HI) enables us to recover the AGM postulates
for contraction from the AGM postulates for revision. More precisely, it has been
shown that: if ∗ and ÷ satisfy (HI), then (1) if ∗ satisfies (K1∗)–(K6∗), then
÷ satisfies(K1÷)–(K6÷) and (2) if ∗ additionally satisfies (K7∗) (resp. (K8∗)),
then ÷ satisfies (K7÷) (resp. (K8÷)) [19, Thms. 3.4 & 3.5].
The single shot revision and contraction behaviour of an agent can be usefully
represented by a set of ‘Ramsey Test conditionals’, whose members are drawn
from an extension Lc of L to include all sentences of the form A ⇒ B, where
A,B ∈ L, and which satisfies the so called Ramsey Test ([20], [21]):
(RT) A ⇒ B ∈ [Ψ]c iff B ∈ [Ψ ∗A]
where [Ψ]c denotes the ‘conditional belief set’ associated with Ψ, that subsumes
[Ψ] and includes the relevant Ramsey Test conditionals. While this principle
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explicitly interprets the content of [Ψ]c in terms of the beliefs held after possible
single revisions, note that, in view of (HI), this conditional belief set also im-
plicitly determines the beliefs held after possible single contractions. The AGM
postulates for revision ensure that conditional belief sets are ‘rational’ in the
technical sense of Lehmann & Magidor [17].3
We follow a number of authors in making use of a ‘semantic’ representation
of the ‘syntactic’ single-step revision and contraction behaviour associated with
a particular belief state Ψ in terms of a total preorder (TPO) Ψ, i.e., a complete
and transitive binary relation, over W . This TPO is sometimes interpreted as
ordering the worlds according to plausibility, with more plausible worlds situated
lower down the ordering. In this representation, the set min(Ψ, [[A]]) := {x ∈
[[A]] | ∀y ∈ [[A]], x Ψ y} of minimal A-worlds corresponds to the set of worlds in
which all and only the sentences in [Ψ ∗ A] are true, with [[[Ψ]]] = min(Ψ,W )
for any Ψ (see, for instance, the representation results in [23, 24]). In terms
of conditional belief sets, the condition A ⇒ B ∈ [Ψ]c thus corresponds to
min(Ψ, [[A]]) ⊆ [[B]]: a conditional belief is held iff the consequent holds in
all the minimal worlds in which the antecedent holds. We will exploit this
correspondence throughout the paper. See Figure 1 for illustration.
Viewed in this way, the question of iterated belief change becomes intimately
bound with the dynamics of Ψ under contraction and revision. This is because,
following one operation of contraction or revision by a sentence A, the beliefs
following a subsequent belief change step will be determined by the TPOs Ψ÷A
or Ψ∗A, associated with Ψ ÷ A and Ψ ∗ A respectively. (HI) then translates
into the constraint that min(Ψ÷A,W ) = min(Ψ,W ) ∪min(Ψ∗¬A,W ).
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3More precisely, the postulates are collectively equivalent to the proposition that |∼Ψ=
{〈A,B〉 | A ⇒ B ∈ [Ψ]c} is a rational consequence relation—a relation that satisfies the
properties of Reflexivity, Left Classical Equivalence, Right Weakening, Left Disjunction, Right
Conjunction and Rational Monotony—that also satisfies a condition known as ‘consistency
preservation’; see [22].
4 Indeed, (HI) amounts to: C ∈ [Ψ ÷ A] iff C ∈ [[Ψ]] and C ∈ [[(Ψ ∗ ¬A) ∗ B]]. So,
translating into the language of minimal sets, it can be presented as: min(4Ψ÷A,W ) ⊆ [[C]]
6
A ∧B A ∧ ¬B ¬A ∧ B ¬A ∧ ¬B
y
w z
x
Figure 1: TPO represention Ψ of a conditional belief set [Ψ]c drawn from a language
with atomic sentences {A,B}. The relation Ψ orders the worlds from bottom to top,
with the minimal world on the lowest level. The columns group worlds according to
the sentences that they validate. The set [Ψ]c includes, for example, the conditionals
⊤ ⇒ A∧B and ¬A ⇒ B but not the conditionals (A ↔ ¬B) ⇒ A or (A ↔ ¬B) ⇒ B.
We will denote the set of all TPOs over W by T (W ). The strict part of Ψ
will be denoted by ≺Ψ and its symmetric part by ∼Ψ. We also shall occasionally
abuse notation and use []c to denote the conditional belief set represented by
a TPO . We shall say that  satisfies a particular sentence or conditional
sentence iff that sentence or conditional sentence is in []c and that it satisfies a
particular set of sentences or conditional sentences iff it satisfies all the sentences
or conditional sentences in that set. Finally, a TPO Ψ will sometimes also
be represented by an ordered partition 〈S1, S2, . . . Sm〉 of W , with x Ψ y iff
r(x,Ψ) ≤ r(y,Ψ), where r(x,Ψ) denotes the ‘rank’ of x with respect to Ψ
and is defined by taking Sr(x,Ψ) to be the cell in the partition that contains x.
3. A näıve proposal and some triviality results
What should an agent believe after performing a contraction followed by a
revision? We would like to extend the Harper Identity to cover this case.5 The
iff both min(4Ψ,W ) ⊆ [[C]] and min(4Ψ∗¬A,W ) ⊆ [[C]]. This is equivalent to: min(4Ψ÷A
,W ) ⊆ [[C]] iff min(4Ψ,W ) ∪ min(4Ψ∗¬A,W ) ⊆ [[C]], which will hold for arbitrary C iff
min(4Ψ÷A,W ) = min(4Ψ,W ) ∪min(4Ψ∗¬A,W ).
5Note that, by (HI), if one knows the outcome, in terms of resulting belief sets, of a
contraction followed by a revision, one thereby also knows the outcome of two successive
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most straightforward suggestion would be to simply replace, in (HI), all terms
denoting belief sets by terms denoting the corresponding conditional belief sets.
For reasons that will become clear shortly, we shall call this proposal the ‘Näıve
Iterated Harper Identity’:
(NiHI) [Ψ÷A]c = [Ψ]c ∩ [Ψ ∗ ¬A]c
Equivalently, the suggestion can be presented as follows:
[(Ψ÷A) ∗B] = [Ψ ∗B] ∩ [(Ψ ∗ ¬A) ∗B]
If B ≡ ⊤ then we obtain (HI) as a special case. Under weak assumptions,
(NiHI) can equivalently be restated in terms of contraction only:
Proposition 1. (NiHI) entails
(NiHI÷) [(Ψ÷A)÷B] = [Ψ] ∩ [Ψ ∗ ¬B] ∩ [Ψ ∗ ¬A] ∩ [(Ψ ∗ ¬A) ∗ ¬B]
and is equivalent to it in the presence of (K3∗) and the Levi Identity:
(LI) [Ψ ∗A] = Cn([Ψ÷ ¬A] ∪ {A}).
However, as Gärdenfors’ classic triviality result and its subsequent refinements
[25, 26, 27] have taught us, the unqualified extension of principles of belief dy-
namics to cover conditional beliefs is a risky business. And indeed, it turns
out that the above proposal is too strong: it can be shown that, under mild
constraints on single shot revision and contraction, it places unacceptable re-
strictions on the space of permissible belief sets or conditional belief sets. Indeed,
we first note the following:
Proposition 2. In the presence of (K5∗), (K6∗) and (K3÷), (HI) and the left-
to-right half of (NiHI) jointly entail the following “Restricted Right Euclidean”
principle:
(RRE) If A is consistent and B ∈ [Ψ ∗A], then [Ψ] ∩ [Ψ ∗A] ⊆ [Ψ ∗B]
contractions.
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But (RRE)6 is a very strong principle indeed. To obtain a sense of just how
implausible it is, consider the following result:
Proposition 3. (RRE) entails that there does not exist a belief state Ψ such
that: (i) [Ψ] = Cn(A∧B), (ii) [Ψ∗¬A] = Cn(¬A∧B) and (iii) [Ψ∗A ↔ ¬B] =
Cn(A ↔ ¬B), where A and B are propositional atoms.
From this, we can see that (RRE) notably entails that there is no epistemic state
associated with the TPO depicted in Figure 1. Furthermore, if we supplement
(RRE) with just a few mild assumptions, matters get even worse:
Proposition 4. In the presence of (K1∗), (K2∗) and (K5∗), (RRE) entails that
there do not exist a state Ψ and non-tautologous sentences A and B in L whose
disjunction A ∨B is tautologous and are such that A,B ∈ [Ψ].
For a concrete illustration of this last implication, let ‘A’ stand for ‘I have no
more than one dollar in my pocket’ and let ‘B’ stand for ‘I have at least one
dollar in my pocket’. (RRE) would prohibit my holding the belief that A ∧ B,
i.e. that I have exactly one dollar in my pocket, a constraint that is clearly
unacceptable.
(NiHI) and its shortcomings can equivalently be recast in semantic terms.
A key concept, which will play a central role throughout the remainder of the
paper, is the following:
Definition 1. A binary combinator ⊕ is a function that takes pairs of TPOs as
inputs and yields a TPO as an output. For convenience, 1⊕2 will sometimes
be denoted by 1⊕2.
6The name for this principle was chosen for the following reason. Framed in terms of
conditionals, (RRE) amounts to: If A is consistent and A ⇒ B,⊤ ⇒ C,A ⇒ C ∈ [Ψ]c, then
B ⇒ C ∈ [Ψ]c. This is a restricted form of: If A is consistent and A ⇒ B,A ⇒ C ∈ [Ψ]c,
then B ⇒ C ∈ [Ψ]c. A relation R is said to have the Right Euclidean property just in case it
satisfies: If aRb and aRc, then bRc.
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Indeed, in view of the equivalence between conditional belief sets and TPOs,
we are, in seeking to extend the Harper Identity to the iterated case, plausibly
looking for an appropriate combinator ⊕ such that:
(Combi) Ψ÷A=Ψ⊕Ψ∗¬A
Now, just as (HI) corresponds, given (Combi), to the following combination
constraint:
(HI⊕) min(1⊕2,W ) = min(1,W ) ∪min(2,W )
(NiHI) amounts to:
(NiHI⊕) For all S ⊆ W , min(1⊕2, S) = min(1, S) ∪min(2, S)
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What our result above effectively demonstrates is that no combinator ⊕ satisfies
(NiHI⊕) unless we place undesirable restrictions on its domain: (NiHI⊕) is too
much to ask for.8
We will continue approaching our issue of interest from a predominantly
semantic perspective for the remainder of the paper.
4. An alternative approach
4.1. TeamQueue combinators
In this section, we retreat from the näıve proposal above to an altogether
weaker set of minimal postulates for ⊕, before taking a look at a concrete family
of ‘Team Queuing’ combinators that satisfy them. We first establish a general
7 From the brief proof in Footnote 4, it is easy to establish, substituting [[B]] for W , that
(NiHI) amounts to the claim that min(4Ψ÷A, [[B]]) = min(4Ψ, [[B]])∪min(4Ψ∗¬A, [[B]]). The
correspondence between this and (NiHI⊕), given (Combi), should be clear.
8The problem that we have just noted for (NiHI) is closely related to the observation that
an intersection of two rational sets of conditionals need not itself be rational, which is familiar
from the literature on nonmonotonic reasoning [17]. We return to this connection below, in
Subsection 4.2.
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characterisation of this family before showing that our set of minimal postulates
suffices to characterise it in our restricted functional domain of interest.
Since we are in the business of extending the Harper Identity, we will begin
by requiring satisfaction of (HI). We call combinators that satisfy this property
‘basic’ combinators. In addition, even though (NiHI) is too strong, certain
weakenings of it do seem to be compelling. Specifically, it seems appropriate
to require that our combination method leads to the following weak lower and
upper bound principles:
(LB) [Ψ÷A]c ⊇ [Ψ]c ∩ [Ψ ∗ ¬A]c
(UB) [Ψ÷A]c ⊆ [Ψ]c ∪ [Ψ ∗ ¬A]c
Equivalently:
[(Ψ÷A) ∗B] ⊇ [Ψ ∗B] ∩ [(Ψ ∗ ¬A) ∗B]
[(Ψ÷A) ∗B] ⊆ [Ψ ∗B] ∪ [(Ψ ∗ ¬A) ∗B]
We note that (LB) corresponds to the direction of (NiHI) that was not impli-
cated in our earlier triviality results. Given (Combi), these will be ensured by
requiring, respectively, the following upper and lower bounds on min(1⊕2, S)
for any S ⊆ W :9
(UB⊕) min(1⊕2, S) ⊆ min(1, S) ∪min(2, S)
(LB⊕) Either min(1⊕2, S) ⊇ min(1, S)
or min(1⊕2, S) ⊇ min(2, S)
These last principles can also be formulated using only binary comparisons:
Proposition 5. (UB⊕) and (LB⊕) are respectively equivalent to the following:
9Note that an upper (respectively lower) bound on sets of worlds yields a lower (respec-
tively upper) bound on sets of beliefs. We omit the proofs of the correspondences here, since
they are similar in flavour to those of the correspondences between (HI) and (HI⊕), or again
(NiHI) and (NiHI⊕). See Footnote 4 and Footnote 7.
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(SPU+⊕) If x ≺1 y and z ≺2 y then either x ≺1⊕2 y or z ≺1⊕2 y
(WPU+⊕) If x 1 y and z 2 y then either x 1⊕2 y or z 1⊕2 y
(SPU+⊕) and (WPU
+
⊕) owe their names to their being respective strengthenings
of the following principles of Strict and Weak Preference Unanimity, which are
analogues of the ‘Weak Pareto’ and ‘Pareto Weak Preference’ principles found
in the social choice literature:10
(SPU⊕) If x ≺1 y and x ≺2 y then x ≺1⊕2 y
(WPU⊕) If x 1 y and x 2 y then x 1⊕2 y
With this set of basic principles in place, we now consider a concrete family
of basic combinators that satisfy both (SPU+⊕) and (WPU
+
⊕), and, indeed, can
be shown to be characterised by precisely these constraints in our functional
domain of interest. We call these ‘TeamQueue’ combinators.
The basic idea behind this family—and the motivation behind the name
given to it—can be grasped by means of the following analogy: A number
of couples go shopping for groceries. The supermarket that they frequent is
equipped with two tills. For each till, we find a sequence of groups of people
queueing to pay for their items. In order to minimise the time spent in the
store, each couple operates by “team queueing”: each member of the pair joins
a group in a different queue and leaves their place to join their partner’s group
in case this second group arrives at the till first. After synchronously processing
their first group of customers, the tills may then operate at different and variable
speeds. We consider the temporal sequence of sets of couples leaving the store.
In our setting, the queues are the two TPOs (with lower elements towards the
head of the queue) and the couples are pairs of copies of each world.
More formally, we assume, for each ordered pair 〈1,2〉 of TPOs, a se-
quence 〈a1,2(i)〉i∈N such that:
10For an accessible book-length introduction to social choice, see for instance [28]. For an
overview of various issues at the intersection of social choice and computer science, see [29].
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(a1) ∅ 6= a1,2(i) ⊆ {1, 2} for each i
(a2) a1,2(1) = {1, 2}
a1,2(i) specifies which queue is to be processed at each step. Condition (a1)
ensures either one or both are processed, while condition (a2) states that both
are processed at the initial stage, ensuring that (HI⊕) holds for the resulting
combinators. The ordered partition 〈T1, T2, . . . , Tm〉 corresponding to 1⊕2 is
then constructed inductively as follows:
Ti =
⋃
j∈a1,2 (i)
min(j ,
⋂
k<i
T ck )
where ‘T c’ denotes the complement of set T andm is minimal such that
⋃
i≤m Ti =
W . With this in hand, we can now offer:
Definition 2. ⊕ is a TeamQueue (TQ) combinator iff, for each ordered pair
〈1,2〉 of TPOs there exists a sequence 〈a1,2(i)〉i∈N satisfying (a1) and (a2)
and such that 1⊕2 is obtained as above.
It is easily verified that TeamQueue combinators are indeed basic combinators.
The following example provides an elementary illustration of the combinator at
work:
Example 1. Suppose that W = {w, x, y, z}, that 1 is the TPO represented by
the ordered partition 〈{z}, {w}, {x, y}〉, and that 2 is represented by 〈{x, z}, {y},
{w}〉. Let ⊕ be a TeamQueue combinator such that 〈a1,2(i)〉i∈N = 〈{1, 2}, {2},
{1}, . . .〉. Then the ordered partition corresponding to 1⊕2 is 〈T1, T2, T3〉 =
〈{x, z}, {y}, {w}〉, since
T1 =
⋃
j∈{1,2}
min(j ,W ) = {x, z}
T2 = min(2, T
c
1 ) = {y}
T3 = min(1, T
c
1 ∩ T
c
2 ) = {w}
See Figure 2 for illustration.
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Figure 2: Illustration of the construction of 1⊕2 in Example 1, with the successive
formations of T1, then T2, and finally T3. The leftmost two boxes at each stage
correspond to the restrictions of the relevant TPOs to W , T c1 and T
c
2 , respectively,
with the lesser worlds in the ordering being placed below the greater ones. Worlds
to be deleted from the input at the next step are represented in grey. Dashed boxes
depict the sets of worlds whose union is to be selected for Ti.
As noted above, TeamQueue combinators satisfy both (SPU+⊕) and (WPU
+
⊕).
In fact, one can show that this family can actually be characterised by these
two conditions, in the presence of a third:
Theorem 1. ⊕ is a TeamQueue combinator iff it is a basic combinator that
satisfies (SPU+⊕), (WPU
+
⊕) and the following ‘no overtaking’ property;
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(NO⊕) For i 6= j, if x ≺i y and z j y, then either x ≺1⊕2 y or
z 1⊕2 y
Taken together, the three postulates (SPU+⊕), (WPU
+
⊕) and (NO⊕) say that in
1⊕2, no world x is allowed to improve its position with respect to both input
orderings 1 and 2. Indeed each postulate blocks one of the three possible
ways in which this ‘no double improvement’ condition could be violated. We
note that this last condition can be shown to correspond to a rather remarkable
property:
Proposition 6. ⊕ is a TeamQueue combinator iff it is a basic combinator that
satisfies the following ‘factoring’ property, for all S ⊆ W :
(F⊕) min(1⊕2, S) is equal to either min(1, S), min(2, S) or
min(1, S) ∪min(2, S)
Given (Combi), (F⊕) yields the claim that [(Ψ÷A)∗B] is equal to either [Ψ∗B],
[(Ψ ∗ ¬A) ∗B] or [Ψ ∗B] ∩ [(Ψ ∗ ¬A) ∗B].
To wrap up this section, it should be noted that the results so far have been
perfectly domain-independent, in the sense that they hold for combinators whose
domain corresponded to the entire space T (W )×T (W ) of pairs of TPOs defined
over W . Our problem of interest is somewhat narrower in scope, however, since
we are interested in the special case in which one of the TPOs is obtained from
the other by means of a revision. In particular, we assume the first two semantic
postulates of [2]:
(C1∗) If x, y ∈ [[A]] then x Ψ∗A y iff x Ψ y
(C2∗) If x, y ∈ [[¬A]] then x Ψ∗A y iff x Ψ y
In other words, 1 and 2 will always be [[A]]-variants for some sentence A, in
the following sense:
Definition 3. Given 1,2∈ T (W ) and S ⊆ W , we say 1 and 2 are S-
variants iff (x 1 y iff x 2 y) holds for all x, y ∈ (S × S) ∪ (S
c × Sc). We
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let V (W ) denote the set of all 〈1,2〉 ∈ T (W ) × T (W ) such that 1,2 are
S-variants for some S ⊆ W .
Example 2. Suppose that W = {w, x, y, z}, that 1 is the TPO represented by
the ordered partition 〈{w}, {x}, {y}, {z}〉, and that 2 is represented by 〈{w},
{x, y}, {z}〉. Then 1 and 2 are {y, z}-variants, since (i) w ≺1 x and w ≺2 x,
as well as (ii) y ≺1 z and y ≺2 z. They are not, however, {x, y}-variants, since
x ≺1 y but y 2 x.
This leads to the following domain restriction on ⊕:
(DOM⊕) Domain(⊕) ⊆ V (W )
As it turns out, this constraint allows for a noteworthy simplification of the char-
acterisation of TeamQueue combinators, allowing us to do away with (NO⊕) en-
tirely:
Proposition 7. Given (DOM⊕), ⊕ is a TeamQueue combinator iff it is a basic
combinator that satisfies (SPU+⊕) and (WPU
+
⊕).
In fact, we can show that the characterisation under our domain restriction only
requires the weaker versions of our preference unanimity conditions:
Proposition 8. Given (DOM⊕), ⊕ satisfies (SPU
+
⊕) and (WPU
+
⊕) iff it satis-
fies (SPU⊕) and (WPU⊕), respectively.
Given Proposition 5 and Proposition 6, the potentially surprising upshot of
Proposition 7 is that, in our domain of interest, satisfaction of (LB) and (UB) en-
tails satisfaction of (F⊕).
4.2. The Synchronous TeamQueue Combinator
A special case of TeamQueue combinators takes a1,2(i) = {1, 2} for all
ordered pairs 〈1,2〉 and all i. This represents a particularly even handed way
of combining TPOs. In terms of our supermarket analogy, it corresponds to the
situation in which the tills process groups of customers at the same speed.
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Definition 4. The Synchronous TeamQueue (STQ) combinator is the Team-
Queue combinator for which a1,2(i) = {1, 2} for all ordered pairs 〈1,2〉
and all i. We will denote the STQ combinator by ⊕STQ.
Example 3. Suppose that W = {x, y, z, w}, that 1 is the TPO represented by
the ordered partition 〈{z}, {w}, {x, y}〉 and 2 is represented by 〈{x, z}, {y}, {w}〉.
Then the ordered partition corresponding to 1⊕STQ2 is 〈T1, T2〉 = 〈{x, z}, {w, y}〉.
See Figure 3 for illustration.11
We have a number of characterisations of this combinator. It can first of all be
characterised semantically, in the absence of domain restrictions, as follows:
Theorem 2. ⊕STQ is the only basic combinator that satisfies both (SPU
+
⊕) and
the following ‘Parity’ constraint:
(PAR⊕) If x ≺1⊕2 y then for each i ∈ {1, 2} there exists z such that
x ∼1⊕2 z and z ≺i y
Note that (WPU+⊕) is not listed among the characteristic principles. Indeed, it is
entailed by the conjunction of (SPU+⊕) and (PAR⊕). Figure 2, which illustrates
11The STQ combinator is to be distinguished from the ‘min’ combinator ⊕min that
ranks worlds according to the minimum rank they receive in the inputs: x 1⊕min2 y iff
min(r(x,1),r(x,2)) ≤ min(r(y,1), r(y,2)).
⊕STQ and ⊕min are indeed distinct, even in our restricted functional domain of interest. To
see this, let x ≺Ψ y ≺Ψ {w, z}. Let ∗ be the lexicographic revision operator (see Subsection 5.2
for definition and references). Then y ≺Ψ∗¬(x∨z) w ≺Ψ∗¬(x∨z) x ≺Ψ∗¬(x∨z) z. Defining ÷
via (Combi) and ⊕STQ, we get: {x, y} ≺Ψ÷x∨z {w, z}. Using ⊕min, however {x, y} ≺Ψ÷x∨z
w ≺Ψ÷x∨z z.
Note that ⊕min does however belong to the TQ family. To demonstrate this, it suffices
to show that ⊕min satisfies (WPU
+
⊕), (SPU
+
⊕) and (NO⊕). We simply prove satisfaction of
(WPU+⊕), since the other principles are handled in a similar manner. Let θ denote min(r(y,1
), r(y,2)). Now suppose y ≺1⊕min2 x and y ≺1⊕min2 z. Then (i) θ < min(r(x,1), r(x,2))
and (ii) θ < min(r(z,1), r(z,2)). We know that either θ = r(y,1) or θ = r(y,2). If
θ = r(y,1), then (i) gives us r(y,1) < r(x,1), i.e. y ≺1 x. If θ = r(y,2), we similarly
recover y ≺2 z from (ii).
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Figure 3: Illustration of the construction of 1⊕2 in Example 3.
a TQ combinator that is distinct from ⊕STQ, provides an example of a failure
of (PAR⊕). Specifically, while we have y ≺1⊕2 w, it is not the case that, for
each i ∈ {1, 2}, there exists z′ such that y ∼1⊕2 z
′ and z′ ≺i w. Indeed, the
only z′ such that y ∼1⊕2 z
′ is y itself and so (PAR⊕) would require y ≺1 w.
But instead, we have w ≺1 y.
Whilst (PAR⊕) may not be immediately easy to grasp, it can be given a
helpful reformulation in terms of the notion of strong belief [30, 31]. A sentence
A ∈ [Ψ] is strongly believed in Ψ in case the only way it can be dislodged by the
next revision input B is if B is logically inconsistent with A. In other words:
Definition 5. A is strongly believed in Ψ iff (i) A ∈ [Ψ], and (ii) A ∈ [Ψ ∗B]
for all sentences B such that A ∧B is consistent.
Semantically, a consistent sentence A is strongly believed in Ψ iff x ≺Ψ y for
every x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]]. With this in hand, one can show:
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Proposition 9. (PAR⊕) is equivalent to:
(SB⊕) If x ≺1⊕2 y for every x ∈ S
c, y ∈ S, then min(1, S)∪
min(2, S) ⊆ min(1⊕2, S)
Given (Combi), (SB⊕) yields: If ¬B is strongly believed in Ψ ÷ A then [(Ψ ÷
A) ∗ B] ⊆ [Ψ ∗ B] ∩ [(Ψ ∗ ¬A) ∗ B]. Thus, although we cannot have (NiHI) for
all A,B, the STQ combinator does guarantee the principle to hold for a certain
restricted class of pairs of sentences, namely those A,B such that ¬B is strongly
believed after contracting by A.
Having said all this, there is however another, possibly more perspicuous,
way of characterising⊕STQ. In order to present it, however, we need to introduce
one further item of notation:
Definition 6. Let ⊒ be a binary relation on T (W ) such that 〈S1, S2, . . . , Sm〉 ⊒
〈T1, T2, . . . , Tm〉 iff either (i) Si = Ti for all i = 1, . . . ,m, or (ii) Si ⊃ Ti for the
first i such that Si 6= Ti.
Note that ⊒ compares TPOs via their representing partitions. We may assume
that both partitions are of equal length m, since we can always fill up the tail
of the shorter one with instances of the empty set, if necessary. The relation
⊒ is clearly reflexive, transitive and antisymmetric. It partially orders T (W )
according to what one might intuitively call comparative ‘flatness’, with the
flatter TPOs appearing ‘greater’ in the ordering. With this interpretation in
mind, we can show that ⊕STQ yields the unique flattest TPO satisfying (SPU
+
⊕):
Theorem 3. 1⊕STQ2 ⊒ 1⊕2, for any TPOs 1 and 2, and any combi-
nator ⊕ satisfying (SPU+⊕).
In view of Proposition 5, this can be restated as the observation that ⊕STQ
yields the flattest TPO that satisfies the set of conditionals satisfied by both
inputs. With the result presented in this manner, readers familiar with the
literature on nonmonotonic reasoning will anticipate the following corollary:
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Corollary 1. [1⊕STQ2]c = CR([1]c ∩ [2]c), where CR is the rational closure
function [17, Definitions 20, 21].
with the Synchronous TeamQueue approach to our problem of interest conse-
quently amounting to:
(iHI) [Ψ÷A]c = CR([Ψ]c ∩ [Ψ ∗ ¬A]c)
Indeed, Booth & Paris [32], for instance, establish, as a corollary of a further re-
sult, that the rational closure of a set of conditionals Γ corresponds to the flattest
TPO that satisfies it.12 Similar results can be found in Rott [33], in relation to
his E-minimal entailment, and Pearl [34], in relation to his 1-entailment, notions
that are essentially identical to rational closure (regarding rational closure’s re-
lation to 1-entailment, see [34]; regarding its relation to E-minimal entailment,
see [35]).
The rational closure of a set of conditionals Γ has been argued to provide the
most conservative or again least opinionated rational conditional belief set that
subsumes Γ.13 Lehmann & Magidor offer a dialogical justification of this claim,
grounded in their syntactic definition of rational closure. On the basis of the
aforementioned semantic result in [33], Rott argues that the conditional belief
set given by the rational closure of Γ minimises degrees of confidence in the
sentences of L among those conditional belief sets that include Γ. Finally, Hill
12Indeed, they establish that a particular kind of construction (essentially an n-ary STQ
combination of the TPOs satisfying Γ) yields a TPO that corresponds to the rational closure of
Γ. In the course of doing this, they establish that this TPO is also the flattest TPO satisfying
Γ. See the proof of their Theorem 2.
13Here, ‘most conservative’ or ‘least opinionated’ cannot be taken to mean ‘set-theoretically
smallest’, since the set of rational consequence relations satisfying a given set of conditionals
is not closed under intersection. In the literature, these notions are understood informally,
although it would probably be desirable to sharpen these into something more precise. One
could indeed seek to (1) define a formal measure of ‘opinionation for a set of conditionals that
would extend a plausible measure for sets of propositional formulae and (2) show that the
rational closure of a set of conditionals Γ is the superset of Γ that minimises this quantity.
We do not currently have such a proposal or result to offer, unfortunately.
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& Paris [36] show that, on their preferred probabilistic semantics for rational
conditionals, the rational closure of Γ corresponds to the maximally entropic
(i.e. least informative) probability function that satisfies Γ. In view of all this,
we suggest that (iHI) constitutes a prima facie very attractive generalisation of
(HI).
5. Putting the proposal to work
As we stated earlier, a central result of AGM theory says that, under as-
sumption of HI, if ∗ satisfies the AGM revision postulates, then ÷ automatically
satisfies the AGM contraction postulates. In this section, we turn our attention
to some of the postulates for both iterated revision and contraction that have
been proposed in the literature. We show that, if Ψ÷A is defined from Ψ and
Ψ∗¬A using (Combi) via a TeamQueue combinator, then satisfaction of some
well known postulates for iterated revision leads to satisfaction of well known
postulates for iterated contraction.
5.1. The Darwiche-Pearl (DP) postulates
The most widely cited postulates for iterated revision are the four DP pos-
tulates of [2]. These, like most of the postulates for iterated belief change, come
in two flavours: a semantic one in terms of requirements on the TPO Ψ∗A as-
sociated to the revised state Ψ∗A, and a syntactic one in terms of requirements
on the belief set [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B] following a sequence of two revisions. Turning
first to the semantic versions, we have already encountered the first two of these
postulates—(C1∗) and (C2
∗
)—in the previous section. The other two are
(C3∗) If x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]] and x ≺Ψ y then x ≺Ψ∗A y
(C4∗) If x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]] and x Ψ y then x Ψ∗A y
Each of these has an equivalent corresponding syntactic version as follows:
(C1∗) If A ∈ Cn(B) then [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B] = [Ψ ∗B]
(C2∗) If ¬A ∈ Cn(B) then [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B] = [Ψ ∗B]
21
(C3∗) If A ∈ [Ψ ∗B] then A ∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B]
(C4∗) If ¬A 6∈ [Ψ ∗B] then ¬A 6∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B]
Chopra et al [9] proposed a list of ‘counterparts’ to the DP postulates for con-
traction. The semantic versions of these were:
(C1÷) If x, y ∈ [[¬A]] then x Ψ÷A y iff x Ψ y
(C2÷) If x, y ∈ [[A]] then x Ψ÷A y iff x Ψ y
(C3÷) If x ∈ [[¬A]], y ∈ [[A]] and x ≺Ψ y then x ≺Ψ÷A y
(C4÷) If x ∈ [[¬A]], y ∈ [[A]] and x Ψ y then x Ψ÷A y
Chopra et al [9] showed (their Theorem 2) that, in the presence of the AGM
postulates (reformulated as in our setting to apply to belief states rather than
just belief sets) each of these postulates has an equivalent syntactic version as
follows:
(C1÷) If ¬A ∈ Cn(B) then [(Ψ÷A) ∗B] = [Ψ ∗B]
(C2÷) If A ∈ Cn(B) then [(Ψ÷A) ∗B] = [Ψ ∗B]
(C3÷) If ¬A ∈ [Ψ ∗B] then ¬A ∈ [(Ψ÷A) ∗B]
(C4÷) If A 6∈ [Ψ ∗B] then A 6∈ [(Ψ÷A) ∗B]14
However, while Chopra et al remarked that their postulates are ‘Darwiche-Pearl-
like’, the precise nature of the connection was not elucidated. As it turns out,
the definition of Ψ÷A from Ψ and Ψ∗¬A using (Combi) via a TeamQueue
combinator affords us a clearer view on the matter:
Proposition 10. Let ⊕ be an arbitrary TeamQueue combinator, let ∗ be an
AGM revision operator and let ÷ be such that Ψ÷A is defined from ∗ via
(Combi) using ⊕. Then, for each i = 1, 2, 3, 4, if ∗ satisfies (Ci∗) then ÷
satisfies (Ci÷).
14(C1÷

)–(C4÷

) have been recently rediscovered in [37], in which a set of somewhat
different-looking syntactic counterparts is also proposed.
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As a corollary, given the AGM postulates, we obviously recover an analogous
result for the syntactic versions.
To round off this subsection, we now turn our attention to the postulate of
‘Principled Factored Intersection’ endorsed by Nayak et al [13], which they show
to be satisfied by a number of proposals for iterated contraction:
(PFI) Given B ∈ [Ψ÷A]
(a) If ¬B → ¬A ∈ [(Ψ÷A)÷B], then
[(Ψ÷A)÷B] = [Ψ÷A] ∩ [Ψ÷ ¬A → B]
(b) If ¬B → ¬A,¬B → A /∈ [(Ψ÷A)÷B], then
[(Ψ÷A)÷B] = [Ψ÷A] ∩ [Ψ÷ ¬A → B] ∩ [Ψ÷A → B]
(c) If ¬B → A ∈ [(Ψ÷A)÷B], then
[(Ψ÷A)÷B] = [Ψ÷A] ∩ [Ψ÷A → B]
The rationale for (PFI) remains rather unclear to date, however. Indeed, the
only justifications provided appear to be (a) that (PFI) avoids a particular
difficulty faced by another constraint that has been proposed in the literature—
namely Rott’s ‘Qualified Intersection’ principle [38]—and which can be refor-
mulated in a manner that is superficially rather similar to (PFI) and (b) that
(PFI) entails a pair of prima facie appealing principles. Neither of these con-
siderations strike us as being particularly compelling. For one, Rott’s Qualified
Intersection principle remains itself unclearly motivated. Secondly, plenty of
ill-advised principles can be shown to have certain plausible consequences.
The TeamQueue approach, however, allows us to rest (PFI) on a far firmer
foundation. Indeed:
Proposition 11. Let ⊕ be a TeamQueue combinator, let ∗ be an AGM revision
operator and let ÷ be such that Ψ÷A is defined from ∗ via (Combi) using ⊕.
If ∗ satisfies (C1∗) and (C2
∗
) then ÷ satisfies (PFI).
5.2. Popular strengthenings of the DP postulates
Three popular approaches to supplementing the AGM and DP postulates
for revision can be found in the literature: the ‘natural’ [5], ‘restrained’ [3], and
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‘lexicographic’ [39] approaches. All of these have the semantic consequence that
the prior TPO Ψ determines the posterior TPO Ψ∗A. All three promote the
lowest A-worlds in Ψ to become the lowest overall in Ψ∗A, but differ on what
to do with the rest of the ordering. Natural revision leaves everything else un-
changed, restrained revision preserves the strict ordering ≺Ψ while additionally
making every A-world x strictly lower than every ¬A-world y for which x Ψ y,
and lexicographic revision just makes every A-world lower than every ¬A-world,
while preserving the ordering within each of [[A]] and [[¬A]].
The obvious question to ask is then the following: Which principles of iter-
ated contraction does one recover from the natural, restrained and lexicographic
revision operators, respectively, if one defines ÷ from ∗, via (Combi), using
⊕STQ? As it turns out, both the natural and the restrained revision operator
yield the very same iterated contraction operator, which has been discussed
in the literature under the name of ‘natural contraction’ [13], and which sets
min(Ψ, [[¬A]])∪min(Ψ,W ) to be the lowest ranked equivalence class in Ψ÷A,
while leaving Ψ÷A otherwise unchanged from Ψ. Indeed, more generally:
Proposition 12. Let ∗ be any revision operator—such as the natural or re-
strained revision operator—satisfying (C1∗), (C2
∗
), (C4
∗
) and the following
property:
If x, y /∈ min(Ψ, [[A]]) and x ≺Ψ y, then x ≺Ψ∗A y
Let ÷ be the contraction operator defined from ∗ via (Combi) using ⊕STQ. Then
÷ is the natural contraction operator.
We do not have a characterisation of the operator that is recovered from lexico-
graphic revision in this manner—that is, the operator ÷ such that Ψ÷A=Ψ
⊕STQ Ψ∗L¬A, where ∗L is lexicographic revision—which we call the STQ-lex
contraction operator (÷STQL). We can report, however, that it is distinct from
both lexicographic contraction (÷L) and priority contraction (÷P), the other
two iterated contraction operators discussed in the literature alongside natural
contraction [13].
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Roughly, lexicographic contraction works by setting the ith-ranked equiv-
alence class Si of Ψ÷A to be the union of the i
th-lowest A-worlds with the
ith-lowest ¬A-worlds. The difference between this approach and STQ-lex con-
traction can be illustrated by the following example:
Example 4. Suppose that W = {v, w, x, y, z} and Ψ is the TPO represented
by 〈{v}, {w}, {x}, {y}, {z}〉. Let [[A]] = {v, z}. We then have Ψ∗L¬A= 〈{w}, {x},
{y}, {v}, {z}〉. Lexicographic contraction yields Ψ÷LA= 〈{v, w}, {z, x}, {y}〉
while STQ-lex contraction gives us Ψ÷STQLA= 〈{v, w}, {x}, {y}, {z}〉. See Fig-
ure 4 for an illustration.
In fact, somewhat more generally, lexicographic contraction cannot be recovered
by any kind of TeamQueue combination of Ψ and Ψ∗L¬A, for any revision
operator ∗ satisfying either (C3∗) or (C4
∗
). Indeed, as we know from Propo-
sition 10, if it could, then it would have to satisfy either (C3÷) or (C4
÷
). But
clearly it does not, as Example 4 shows: there, we have z ∈ [[¬A]], y ∈ [[A]] and
y ≺Ψ z but z ≺Ψ÷LA y, in contradiction with both principles.
The posterior TPO Ψ÷PA obtained by priority contraction is defined piece-
wise. If A ∈ [Ψ] or A is a tautology, then set Ψ÷PA=Ψ. Otherwise, define
Ψ÷PA by taking the TPO Ψ∗L¬A, resulting from the lexicographic revision
of Ψ by ¬A and then shifting any A-worlds that were initially in the minimal
set of Ψ into its minimal set, leaving all else unchanged. The non-equivalence
of this procedure to STQ-lex contraction can be seen in the following example:
Example 5. Suppose that W = {w, x, y, z} and Ψ is the TPO represented
by 〈{x}, {y, z}, {w}〉. Let [[A]] = {x, y}, so that Ψ∗L¬A= 〈{z}, {w}, {x}, {y}〉.
Then STQ-lex contraction yields Ψ÷STQLA= 〈{x, z}, {y, w}〉 while priority con-
traction gives us Ψ÷PA= 〈{x, z}, {w}, {y}〉. See Figure 5 for an illustration.
More generally, priority contraction cannot be recovered by combination of Ψ
with any other ordering, by any combination method that satisfies (PAR⊕).
Indeed, we know from Proposition 9 that (PAR⊕) is equivalent to (SB⊕), which
in turn, given (Combi) entails: If x ≺Ψ÷A y for every x ∈ S
c, y ∈ S, then
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Figure 4: Illustration of Example 4.
min(Ψ, S) ⊆ min(Ψ÷A, S). However, as Example 5 demonstrates, this last
condition is violated by priority contraction. Indeed, let S = {y, w}. Then
u ≺Ψ÷A v for every u ∈ S
c, v ∈ S, y ∈ min(Ψ, S) but y /∈ min(Ψ÷A, S).
Both lexicographic and priority contraction can, however, still be recovered
via the TeamQueue approach, broadly construed. Lexicographic contraction can
be recovered from lexicographic revision by combining, not Ψ and Ψ∗L¬A, but
rather Ψ∗LA and Ψ∗L¬A using ⊕STQ. Priority contraction can be recovered
from lexicographic revision by combining Ψ and Ψ∗¬A using a TeamQueue
combinator. However, the combinator involved is not ⊕STQ but rather the
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TeamQueue combinator that is most ‘biased’ towards 2: the combinator ⊕2 for
which, for all ordered pairs 〈1,2〉, a1,2(1) = {1, 2}, then a1,2(j) = {2}
for all j > 1. We then set: Ψ÷A=Ψ, if A ∈ [Ψ] or A is a tautology, otherwise
Ψ÷A=Ψ ⊕2 Ψ∗¬A.
Before closing this paper, we should briefly mention a property that is shared
by both natural and restrained revision and which was introduced in [3] and
then, independently, in [6].15 This is the property known as (P∗) or ‘Indepen-
dence’, which strengthens both (C3∗) and (C4∗):
(P∗) If ¬A 6∈ [Ψ ∗B], then A ∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B]
15We thank an anonymous referee for pressing us on this.
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Its semantic counterpart is given by:
(P∗

) If x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]] and x 4Ψ y, then x ≺Ψ∗A y
One might wonder whether these principles have counterparts for contraction,
in the sense of principles that are common and exclusive to those contraction
operators that are definable, via a suitable extension of (HI) to the iterated case,
from a revision operator that satisfies (P∗)/(P∗

).
This question is most likely answerable in the negative. Indeed, if we assume
that the appropriate extension of (HI) is given by the STQ method, then, as we
have shown, both natural revision (which lacks property (P∗)) and restrained
revision (which has property (P∗)) are mapped onto the same contraction op-
erator, namely natural contraction.
Of course, if one does not commit to the STQ method, the question remains
open. But whatever the fact of the matter may be in this alternative case, we
note that the following properties—which some may be tempted to consider—
will certainly not constitute respective counterparts for (P∗) and (P∗

):
(P÷) If A 6∈ [Ψ ∗B], then ¬A ∈ [(Ψ÷A) ∗B]
(P÷

) If x ∈ [[¬A]], y ∈ [[A]] and x 4Ψ y, then x ≺Ψ÷A y
Indeed, if we set B = ⊤, (P÷) gives us: If A /∈ [Ψ], then ¬A ∈ [Ψ ÷ A]. But
this conflicts with the AGM postulate of Inclusion for contraction, i.e. (K2÷),
since, in a situation in which A,¬A /∈ [Ψ], we wind up with [Ψ÷A] * [Ψ].
6. Conclusions
We have shown that the issue of extending the Harper Identity to iterated be-
lief change is not a straightforward affair but that it is one that can be fruitfully
approached by combining a pair of total preorders by means of a TeamQueue
combinator. In the course of the discussion, one particular combinator has
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stood out as being of particular interest: the Synchronous TeamQueue combi-
nator ⊕STQ. We have notably proven that the conditional belief set obtained
by Synchronous TeamQueue combination corresponds to the rational closure of
the set of conditional beliefs common to both inputs. As a number of authors
have noted, the rational closure of a set of conditionals Γ corresponds to what
is arguably the least opinionated conditional belief set that includes Γ. We have
also shown that ⊕STQ can be put to work to derive various counterparts for
contraction of the three best known iterated revision operators.
One issue that we would like to explore in future work is the question of
whether or not it is possible to show that the Darwiche-Pearl postulates are
equivalent to the ones proposed by Chopra et al, given a suitable further bridge
principle taking us from iterated contraction to iterated revision. Such a task
would first involve providing a compelling generalisation of the Levi Identity
mentioned in Proposition 1 above.
Also of interest would be the derivation of analogues for contraction of yet
further principles of iterated revision, such as the ones recently identified in [40].
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Appendix
Proposition 1. (NiHI) entails
(NiHI÷) [(Ψ÷A)÷B] = [Ψ] ∩ [Ψ ∗ ¬B] ∩ [Ψ ∗ ¬A] ∩ [(Ψ ∗ ¬A) ∗ ¬B]
and is equivalent to it in the presence of (K3∗) and the Levi Identity:
(LI) [Ψ ∗A] = Cn([Ψ÷ ¬A] ∪ {A}).
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Proof:
(a) From (NiHI) to (NiHI÷): By (HI), which (NiHI) entails, [(Ψ ÷ A) ÷
B] = [Ψ ÷ A] ∩ [(Ψ ÷ A) ∗ ¬B] = [Ψ] ∩ [Ψ ∗ ¬A] ∩ [(Ψ ÷ A) ∗ ¬B].
Furthermore, by (NiHI), we have [(Ψ ÷ A) ∗ ¬B] = [Ψ ∗ ¬B] ∩ [(Ψ ∗
¬A)∗¬B]. Hence [(Ψ÷A)÷B] = [Ψ]∩[Ψ∗¬B]∩[Ψ∗¬A]∩[(Ψ∗¬A)∗¬B],
as required.
(b) From (NiHI÷) to (NiHI): By (LI), we have [(Ψ÷A)∗¬B] = Cn([(Ψ÷
A)÷B]∪{¬B}). By (NiHI÷), we have [(Ψ÷A)÷B] = [Ψ]∩ [Ψ∗¬B]∩
[Ψ ∗ ¬A]∩ [(Ψ ∗ ¬A) ∗ ¬B]. So to recover (NiHI), we need to show that
Cn([Ψ]∩[Ψ∗¬B]∩[Ψ∗¬A]∩[(Ψ∗¬A)∗¬B]∪{¬B}) = [Ψ∗¬B]∩[(Ψ∗¬A)∗
¬B]. The left-to-right direction, i.e. Cn([Ψ]∩ [Ψ∗¬B]∩ [Ψ∗¬A]∩ [(Ψ∗
¬A)∗¬B]∪{¬B}) ⊆ [Ψ∗¬B]∩[(Ψ∗¬A)∗¬B], is immediate. Regarding
the right-to-left, assume, for some arbitrary C, that C ∈ [Ψ ∗ ¬B] ∩
[(Ψ∗¬A)∗¬B]. Firstly, it follows by (K3∗) and the deduction theorem
that ¬B → C ∈ [Ψ] and ¬B → C ∈ [Ψ ∗ ¬A]. Secondly, it follows by
deductive closure of belief sets that ¬B → C ∈ [Ψ∗¬B]∩[(Ψ∗¬A)∗¬B].
Therefore ¬B → C ∈ [Ψ] ∩ [Ψ ∗ ¬B] ∩ [Ψ ∗ ¬A] ∩ [(Ψ ∗ ¬A) ∗ ¬B] and
hence C ∈ Cn([Ψ] ∩ [Ψ ∗ ¬B] ∩ [Ψ ∗ ¬A] ∩ [(Ψ ∗ ¬A) ∗ ¬B] ∪ {¬B}), as
required. 
Proposition 2. In the presence of (K5∗), (K6∗) and (K3÷), (HI) and the left-
to-right half of (NiHI) jointly entail the following “Restricted Right Euclidean”
principle:
(RRE) If A is consistent and B ∈ [Ψ ∗A], then [Ψ] ∩ [Ψ ∗A] ⊆ [Ψ ∗B]
Proof: Assume (K5∗), (K6∗) and (K3÷), (HI) and the left-to-right half of
(NiHI). Assume that A is consistent and that B ∈ [Ψ∗A]. Since A is consistent,
so too is [Ψ ∗ A], by (K5∗), and hence ¬B /∈ [Ψ ∗ A]. Since, by (HI), we
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have [Ψ ÷ ¬A] = [Ψ] ∩ [Ψ ∗ A] (with help from (K6∗)), it follows that ¬B /∈
[Ψ ÷ ¬A]. Given (K3÷), we then have [(Ψ ÷ ¬A) ÷ ¬B] = [Ψ ÷ ¬A], and, by
(HI), [(Ψ÷ ¬A)÷ ¬B] = [Ψ] ∩ [Ψ ∗A].
By (HI), [(Ψ÷¬A)÷¬B] = [Ψ÷¬A]∩[(Ψ÷¬A)∗B] ⊆ [(Ψ÷¬A)∗B]. By the
left-to-right half of (NiHI), we have [(Ψ÷¬A)∗B] ⊆ [Ψ∗B]∩ [(Ψ∗¬¬A)∗B] ⊆
[Ψ ∗B]. Hence [(Ψ÷ ¬A)÷ ¬B] ⊆ [Ψ ∗B].
From [(Ψ ÷ ¬A) ÷ ¬B] ⊆ [Ψ ∗ B] and [(Ψ ÷ ¬A) ÷ ¬B] = [Ψ] ∩ [Ψ ∗ A], it
then follows that [Ψ] ∩ [Ψ ∗A] ⊆ [Ψ ∗B], as required. 
Proposition 3. (RRE) entails that there does not exist a belief state Ψ such
that: (i) [Ψ] = Cn(A∧B), (ii) [Ψ∗¬A] = Cn(¬A∧B) and (iii) [Ψ∗A ↔ ¬B] =
Cn(A ↔ ¬B), where A and B are propositional atoms.
Proof: Assume (RRE) and, for reductio, that there exists a belief set satisfying
(i) to (iii). It follows from (ii) that A ↔ ¬B ∈ [Ψ ∗ ¬A]. Given the latter,
it then follows from (RRE) that [Ψ] ∩ [Ψ ∗ ¬A] ⊆ [Ψ ∗ A ↔ ¬B]. But by (i)
and (ii), [Ψ] ∩ [Ψ ∗ ¬A] = Cn(A ∧ B) ∩ Cn(¬A ∧ B) = Cn(B). Hence, by
[Ψ] ∩ [Ψ ∗ ¬A] ⊆ [Ψ ∗ A ↔ ¬B], we have B ∈ [Ψ ∗ A ↔ ¬B]. But (iii) tells us
that [Ψ ∗A ↔ ¬B] = Cn(A ↔ ¬B). Contradiction. 
Proposition 4. In the presence of (K1∗), (K2∗) and (K5∗), (RRE) entails that
there do not exist a state Ψ and non-tautologous sentences A and B in L whose
disjunction A ∨B is tautologous and are such that A,B ∈ [Ψ].
Proof: Assume, for contradiction, that there exists a state Ψ and non-tautologous
sentences A and B in L whose disjunction A ∨ B is tautologous and are such
that A,B ∈ [Ψ]. By (K1∗) and (K2∗), ¬A ∨ ¬B ∈ [Ψ ∗ ¬A]. Since A is non-
tautologous, and hence ¬A is consistent, it follows by (RRE) that [Ψ]∩[Ψ∗¬A] ⊆
[Ψ ∗ ¬A ∨ ¬B]. Since A ∨ B is tautologous, by (K1∗) and (K2∗), we have
B ∈ [Ψ∗¬A]. Hence, since we have assumed B ∈ [Ψ], it follows by the above in-
clusion that B ∈ [Ψ∗¬A∨¬B]. By the same reasoning (swapping the roles of A
31
and B), we obtain A ∈ [Ψ∗¬A∨¬B]. So we have A,B ∈ [Ψ∗¬A∨¬B] but also,
by (K2∗), ¬A∨¬B ∈ [Ψ∗¬A∨¬B]. Hence [Ψ∗¬A∨¬B] is inconsistent. Since
both A and B have been assumed to be non-tautologous, ¬A∨¬B is consistent.
It then follows, by (K5∗), that [Ψ ∗ ¬A ∨ ¬B] is consistent. Contradiction. 
Proposition 5. (UB⊕) and (LB⊕) are respectively equivalent to the following:
(SPU+⊕) If x ≺1 y and z ≺2 y then either x ≺1⊕2 y or z ≺1⊕2 y
(WPU+⊕) If x 1 y and z 2 y then either x 1⊕2 y or z 1⊕2 y
Proof:
(a) From (UB⊕) to (SPU
+
⊕): Suppose that x ≺1 y and z ≺2 y. From the
former, we know that min(1, {x, y, z}) ⊆ {x, z} and from the latter
we know that min(2, {x, y, z}) ⊆ {x, z}. Thus, by (UB⊕), min(1⊕2
, {x, y, z}) ⊆ {x, z}. From this, it must the case that y /∈ min(1⊕2
, {x, y, z}), so either x ≺1⊕2 y or z ≺1⊕2 y, as required.
(b) From (SPU+⊕) to (UB⊕): Assume for contradiction that there exists
an x, such that x ∈ min(1⊕2, S) but x /∈ min(1, S) ∪ min(2, S).
From the latter, there exist y, z ∈ S, such that y ≺1 x and z ≺2 x. By
(SPU+⊕), it then follows that either y ≺1⊕2 x or z ≺1⊕2 x, contradicting
x ∈ min(1⊕2, S). Thus, min(1⊕2, S) ⊆ min(1, S) ∪min(2, S), as
required.
(c) From (LB⊕) to (WPU
+
⊕): We derive the contrapositive of (WPU
+
⊕),
namely:
If y ≺1⊕2 x and y ≺1⊕2 z, then y ≺1 x or y ≺2 z
Assume then that y ≺1⊕2 x and y ≺1⊕2 z. It follows from this
that min(1⊕2, {x, y, z}) ⊆ {y}. By (LB⊕), we then recover either
(i) min(1, {x, y, z}) ⊆ {y} or (ii) min(2, {x, y, z}) ⊆ {y}. Assume
(i). It follows that y ≺1 x. Assume (ii). It follows that y ≺2 z. Hence,
either y ≺1 x or y ≺2 z, as required.
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(d) From (WPU+⊕) to (LB⊕): Assume for reductio that (LB⊕) fails, so
that there exist an x and a y such that y ∈ min(1, S) and z ∈ min(2
, S), but y, z /∈ min(1⊕2, S). From the latter, there exist an x1 and
x2 such that x1, x2 ∈ S, x1 ≺1⊕2 y and x2 ≺1⊕2 z. Since 1⊕2 is a
total preorder, we may assume that there exists an x such that x ∈ S,
x ≺1⊕2 y and x ≺1⊕2 z. By (WPU
+
⊕), we then have either x ≺1 y
or x ≺2 z, contradicting our assumption that y ∈ min(1, S) and
z ∈ min(2, S). 
Theorem 1. ⊕ is a TeamQueue combinator iff it is a basic combinator that
satisfies (SPU+⊕), (WPU
+
⊕) and the following ‘no overtaking’ property;
(NO⊕) For i 6= j, if x ≺i y and z j y, then either x ≺1⊕2 y or
z 1⊕2 y
Proof: We prove the following claim:
Corollary 2. ⊕ satisfies (SPU+⊕), (WPU
+
⊕) and (NO⊕) iff it satisfies
(F⊕) min(1⊕2, S) is equal to either min(1, S), min(2, S) or
min(1, S) ∪min(2, S)
Given this, the desired result then follows from Proposition 6 below.
(a) From (SPU+⊕), (WPU
+
⊕) and (NO⊕) to (F⊕): We know that min(1⊕2
, S) ⊆ min(1, S) ∪ min(2, S) from (UB⊕), which was shown to be
equivalent to (SPU+⊕) in Proposition 5. Now if the converse holds,
i.e. min(1, S) ∪min(2, S) ⊆ min(1⊕2, S), then we have min(1⊕2
, S) = min(1, S) ∪ min(2, S) and we are done. So assume min(1
, S)∪min(2, S) * min(1⊕2, S). Then either min(1, S) * min(1⊕2
, S) or min(2, S) * min(1⊕2, S). Let’s assume min(1, S) * min(1⊕2
, S). We will show that this implies min(1⊕2, S) = min(2, S), which
will suffice. (If instead we assume min(2, S) * min(1⊕2, S), then
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the same reasoning will show min(1⊕2, S) = min(1, S), which also
suffices.) Since min(1, S) * min(1⊕2, S), let x ∈ min(1, S) but
x /∈ min(1⊕2, S).
We first derive min(1⊕2, S) ⊆ min(2, S). Let y ∈ min(1⊕2, S) and
assume for reductio that y /∈ min(2, S). Then ∃z ∈ S such that
z ≺2 y. From y ∈ min(1⊕2, S), we know that y 1⊕2 z. From
x ∈ min(1, S), we also know that x 1 y. From z ≺2 y, y 1⊕2 z and
x 1 y, we can deduce by (NO⊕)that x 1⊕2 y, in contradiction with
x 6∈ min(1⊕2, S). Hence, y ∈ min(2, S), as required.
We now derive min(2, S) ⊆ min(1⊕2, S). Let y ∈ min(2, S) and
assume, for reductio, that y /∈ min(1⊕2, S). From x, y /∈ min(1⊕2
, S), ∃z ∈ S, such that z ≺1⊕2 x and z ≺1⊕2 y. Then, from (WPU
+
⊕),
we have either z ≺1 x or z ≺2 y. If z ≺1 x, then we contradict
x ∈ min(1, S). If z ≺2 y, then we contradict y ∈ min(2, S). Either
way, we obtaina contradiction, so y ∈ min(1⊕2, S), as required.
(b)(i) From (F⊕) to (SPU
+
⊕): From (F⊕), we know that (UB⊕) holds, i.e.,
∀S, min(1⊕2, S) ⊆ min(1, S) ∪ min(2, S). This is equivalent to
(SPU+⊕) by Proposition 5.
(b)(ii) From (F⊕) to (WPU
+
⊕): From (F⊕), we know that, ∀S, either min(1
, S) ⊆ min(1⊕2, S) or min(2, S) ⊆ min(1⊕2, S). This is the prop-
erty (LB⊕) and we already proved in relation to Proposition 5 that it
entails (WPU+⊕).
(b)(iii) From (F⊕) to (NO⊕): From (F⊕), we know that, ∀S, i 6= j, ei-
ther min(1⊕2, S) ⊆ min(i, S) or min(j , S) ⊆ min(1⊕2, S). Now
assume x ≺i y, y 1⊕2 x, z j y and, for reductio, y ≺1⊕2 z.
From y 1⊕2 x and y ≺1⊕2 z, we obtainy ∈ min(1⊕2, {x, y, z})
but from x ≺i y, we obtainy /∈ min(i, {x, y, z}). Hence min(1⊕2
, {x, y, z}) * min(i, {x, y, z}). From this and the property cited at the
beginning of this paragraph, we obtain min(j , {x, y, z}) ⊆ min(1⊕2
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, {x, y, z}). We also know from (F⊕)that min(1⊕2, {x, y, z}) ⊆ min(1
, {x, y, z}) ∪ min(2, {x, y, z}). Hence, since y ∈ min(1⊕2, {x, y, z})
and y /∈ min(i, {x, y, z}), we obtainy ∈ min(j , {x, y, z}). Hence,
since z j y, z ∈ min(j , {x, y, z}) and so, from min(j , {x, y, z}) ⊆
min(1⊕2, {x, y, z}), z ∈ min(1⊕2, {x, y, z}), contradicting y ≺1⊕2 z.
Hence z 1⊕2 y, as required. 
Proposition 6. ⊕ is a TeamQueue combinator iff it is a basic combinator that
satisfies the following ‘factoring’ property, for all S ⊆ W :
(F⊕) min(1⊕2, S) is equal to either min(1, S), min(2, S) or
min(1, S) ∪min(2, S)
Proof:
(a) Right-to-left direction: Let ⊕ be any combinator that satisfies those
properties. We must specify a sequence 〈a1,2(i)〉i∈N for each ordered
pair 〈1,2〉 such that (i) the sequence satisfies properties (a1) and
(a2) and (ii) ⊕a = ⊕.
Assume that 〈S1, S2, . . . , Sn〉 represents 1⊕2. Then we specify a1,2
by setting, for all i,
j ∈ a1,2(i) iff min(j ,
⋂
k<i
Sck) ⊆ Si(= min(1⊕2,
⋂
k<i
Sck))
Regarding (i), a1,2 satisfies (a1) since ⊕ satisfies (F⊕)and (a2) since
⊕ satisfies (HI⊕).
Regarding (ii), let 〈T1, T2, . . . , Tm〉 represent 1⊕a2. We prove by in-
duction that Ti = Si. Regarding i = 1: The result follows from (HI⊕).
Regarding the inductive step: Assume Tj = Sj , ∀j < i. We want to
show Ti = Si. By construction, Ti =
⋃
j∈a1,2 (i)
min(j ,
⋂
k<i S
c
k). So
we need to show min(1⊕2,
⋂
k<i S
c
k) =
⋃
j∈a1,2 (i)
min(j ,
⋂
k<i S
c
k).
This follows from (F⊕).
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(b) Left-to-right direction: Given Corollary 2, which we established in
the course of the proof of Theorem 1 and which states that (F⊕) is
equivalent to the conjunction of (SPU+⊕), (WPU
+
⊕) and (NO⊕), it suf-
fices to show that ⊕a satisfies each of these three properties.
(i) Regarding (SPU+⊕): We prove the contrapositive. Suppose y 1⊕2
x and y 1⊕2 z and suppose 〈S1, S2, . . . , Sn〉 represents 1⊕2. As-
sume y ∈ Si =
⋃
j∈a1,2 (i)
min(j ,
⋂
k<i S
c
k) ⊆ min(1,
⋂
k<i S
c
k)∪
min(2,
⋂
k<i S
c
k). Assume y ∈ min(1,
⋂
k<i S
c
k). Since y 1⊕2
x, we know that x ∈
⋂
k<i S
c
k, hence y 1 x, as required. Similarly,
if y ∈ min(2,
⋂
k<i S
c
k), then y 2 z.
(ii) Regarding (WPU+⊕): We prove the contrapositive. Suppose
y ≺1⊕2 x and y ≺1⊕2 z. Assume y ∈ Si. Since y ≺1⊕2 x and
y ≺1⊕2 z, we know that x, z ∈
⋂
k<i S
c
k ∩ S
c
i . Now, we know
that Si ⊆ equals one of min(1,
⋂
k<i S
c
k), min(2,
⋂
k<i S
c
k) or
min(1,
⋂
k<i S
c
k) ∪ min(2,
⋂
k<i S
c
k). We consider each case in
turn:
(1) Case in which Si = min(1,
⋂
k<i S
c
k): From y ∈ Si and
x ∈
⋂
k<i S
c
k ∩ S
c
i , we have y ≺1 x, as required.
(2) Case in which Si = min(2,
⋂
k<i S
c
k): From y ∈ Si and
z ∈
⋂
k<i S
c
k ∩ S
c
i , we have y ≺2 z, as required.
(3) Case in which Si = min(1,
⋂
k<i S
c
k) ∪ min(2,
⋂
k<i S
c
k):
Either we have y ∈ min(1,
⋂
k<i S
c
k), in which case y ≺1 x,
or y ∈ min(2,
⋂
k<i S
c
k), in which case y ≺2 z.
(iii) Regarding (NO⊕): We show: If x ≺i y, y 1⊕2 x and y ≺1⊕2 z,
then y ≺j z, i 6= j, i, j ∈ {1, 2}. Assume y ∈ St. Then, from
y 1⊕2 x and y ≺1⊕2 z, we have x, z ∈
⋂
k<t S
c
t and further-
more z ∈ Sct . We know that St equals one of min(1,
⋂
k<t S
c
k),
min(2,
⋂
k<t S
c
k) or min(1,
⋂
k<t S
c
k) ∪min(2,
⋂
k<t S
c
k). From
x ≺i y, we know that y /∈ min(i,
⋂
k<t S
c
k), hence we must have
y ∈ min(j ,
⋂
k<t S
c
k). Furthermore, we are left with either St =
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min(j ,
⋂
k<t S
c
k) or St = min(1,
⋂
k<t S
c
k) ∪ min(2,
⋂
k<t S
c
k).
In either case, since z ∈ Sct , we must have y ≺j z, as required. 
Proposition 7. Given (DOM⊕), ⊕ is a TeamQueue combinator iff it is a basic
combinator that satisfies (SPU+⊕) and (WPU
+
⊕).
Proof: We show that, given (DOM⊕), if ⊕ satisfies (SPU
+
⊕) and (WPU
+
⊕),
then it satisfies (NO⊕) and hence, by Theorem 1 and Proposition 8, it is a
TeamQueue combinator.
Suppose x ≺i y, y 1⊕2 x and z j y, with i 6= j. We must show z 1⊕2 y.
If we can show z i y, then we can conclude z 1⊕2 y from (WPU⊕). So
suppose for reductio that y ≺i z. From (DOM⊕), ∃S, such that, ∀u, v ∈ S,
u 1 v iff u 2 v and ∀u, v ∈ S
c, u 1 v iff u 2 v. From z j y and y ≺i z, it
must be the case that y ∈ S and z ∈ Sc. If x ∈ S, then from x ≺i y, we obtain
x ≺j y and so x ≺1⊕2 y from (SPU⊕), contradicting y 1⊕2 x. If x ∈ S
c, then,
since x ≺i y ≺i z and z ∈ S
c, x ≺j z. So from this and z j y, we obtain
x ≺j y and so again x ≺1⊕2 y from (SPU⊕), contradicting y 1⊕2 x. Hence, it
must be that z i y, as required. 
Proposition 8. Given (DOM⊕), ⊕ satisfies (SPU
+
⊕) and (WPU
+
⊕) iff it satis-
fies (SPU⊕) and (WPU⊕), respectively.
Proof: We prove this by demonstrating the equivalence, given (DOM⊕), of
(SPU⊕) and (WPU⊕) with (UB⊕) and (LB⊕), respectively, which we have
shown (see Proposition 5) to be equivalent to (SPU+⊕) and (WPU
+
⊕), respec-
tively. Regarding (SPU⊕) and (UB⊕), our proof is direct. Regarding (WPU⊕) and
(LB⊕), we first show that (WPU⊕) is equivalent to the following weakening of
(LB⊕):
(LB−⊕) min(1, S) ∩min(2, S) ⊆ min(1⊕2, S)
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before showing that (LB−⊕) is equivalent to (LB⊕) under the domain restriction
(DOM⊕).
(a)(i) From (UB⊕) to (SPU⊕): The result follows from the fact that x  y
iff x ∈ min(, {x, y}).
(a)(ii) From (SPU⊕) to (UB⊕): We must show that min(1⊕2, S) ⊆ min(1
, S) ∪ min(2, S). Assume (DOM⊕), (SPU⊕)and that there exists an
x, such that x ∈ min(1⊕2, S) but, for contradiction, that x /∈ min(1
, S) ∪min(2, S). From the latter, there exist y1, y2 ∈ S, such that (i)
y1 ≺1 x and (ii) y2 ≺2 x. From the minimality of x, (iii) x 1⊕2 y1
and (iv) x 1⊕2 y2. From (i) and (iii) on the one hand and (ii) and
(iv) on the other, by (SPU⊕), we recover (v) x 2 y1 and (vi) x 1 y2,
respectively. The conjunctions of (i) and (vi), i.e. y1 ≺1 x 1 y2,
and of (ii) and (v), i.e. y2 ≺2 x 2 y1, however, jointly contradict
(DOM⊕), since the latter entails that there exist no x, y1, y2 such that
y1 ≺1 x 1 y2 but y2 ≺2 x 2 y1. Hence x ∈ min(1, S) ∪min(2, S),
as required.
(b)(i) From (WPU⊕) to (LB
−
⊕): Let x ∈ min(1, S)∩min(2, S) and assume
for reductio that x /∈ min(1⊕2, S). Then there exists y ∈ S such
that y ≺1⊕2 x. By (WPU⊕), either y ≺1 x or y ≺2 x. Assume
y ≺1 x (the other case is analogous). Then x /∈ min(1, S) and hence
x /∈ min(1, S)∩min(2, S). Contradiction. Hence, x ∈ min(1⊕2, S),
as required.
(b)(ii) From (LB−⊕) to (WPU⊕): Suppose x 1 y and x 2 y. Then x ∈
min(1, {x, y}) ∩min(2, {x, y}). Assume for reductio that y ≺1⊕2 x.
Then x /∈ min(1⊕2, {x, y}), so, from (LB
−
⊕), x /∈ min(1, {x, y}) ∩
min(2, {x, y}). Contradiction. Hence x 1⊕2 y, as required.
(c)(i) From (LB⊕) to (LB
−
⊕): Obvious.
(c)(ii) From (LB−⊕) to (LB⊕): Assume that (LB⊕) doesn’t hold. Then
there exists an S such that min(1, S) * min(1⊕2, S) and min(2
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, S) * min(1⊕2, S). So there exist x, y ∈ S such that x ∈ min(1, S),
y ∈ min(2, S) and x, y /∈ min(1⊕2, S). Hence there exists z ∈ S such
that z ≺1⊕2 x and z ≺1⊕2 y. By (LB
−
⊕), equivalently by (WPU⊕),
we know from z ≺1⊕2 x that either z ≺1 x or z ≺2 x. From this
and the fact that x ∈ min(1, S), we recover the result that z ≺2 x.
Similarly, we also recover z ≺1 y. So we obtain the following pattern:
x 1 z ≺1 y and y 2 z ≺2 x. But this is not possible given (DOM⊕).
Hence (LB⊕) holds, as required. 
Theorem 2. ⊕STQ is the only basic combinator that satisfies both (SPU
+
⊕) and
the following ‘Parity’ constraint:
(PAR⊕) If x ≺1⊕2 y then for each i ∈ {1, 2} there exists z such that
x ∼1⊕2 z and z ≺i y
Proof: We need to show that if ⊕ satisfies (SPU+⊕) and (PAR⊕), for any 1,2,
we have 1⊕2=1⊕STQ2. Assume that 1⊕2 and 1⊕STQ2 are represented by
〈S1, S2, . . . , Sm〉 and 〈T1, T2, . . . , Tn〉 respectively. We will prove, by induction
on i, that Si = Ti, ∀i. Assume Sj = Tj , ∀j < i. We must show Si = Ti.
(a) Regarding Si ⊆ Ti: Let x ∈ Si, so that x 1⊕2 y, ∀y ∈
⋂
j<i S
c
j .
Assume for reductio that x /∈ Ti. Since x ∈ Si, we know that x ∈
⋂
j<i S
c
j =
⋂
j<i T
c
j . Hence, since x /∈ Ti and, by construction of
1⊕STQ2, there exists y1 ∈
⋂
j<i T
c
j such that y1 ≺1 x and there exists
y2 ∈
⋂
j<i T
c
j such that y2 ≺2 x. Then, by (SPU
+
⊕), either y1 ≺1⊕2 x or
y2 ≺1⊕2 x, in both cases contradicting x 1⊕2 y, ∀y ∈
⋂
j<i S
c
j . Hence
x ∈ Ti, as required.
(ii) Regarding Ti ⊆ Si: Let x ∈ Ti. Then, by construction of 1⊕STQ2,
we have x ∈ min(1,
⋂
j<i T
c
j )∪min(2,
⋂
j<i T
c
j ). Assume for reductio
that x /∈ Si. We know that x ∈
⋂
j<i T
c
j , so by the inductive hypothesis,
x ∈
⋂
j<i S
c
j . From this and x /∈ Si we know that there exists a y ∈ Si,
such that y ≺1⊕2 x. Then from (PAR⊕), there exist a z1 ∈ Si such
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that z1 ≺1 x and a z2 ∈ Si such that z2 ≺2 x. But this contradicts
x ∈ min(1,
⋂
j<i T
c
j ) ∪min(2,
⋂
j<i T
c
j ). Hence x ∈ Si, as required.

Proposition 9. (PAR⊕) is equivalent to:
(SB⊕) If x ≺1⊕2 y for every x ∈ S
c, y ∈ S, then min(1, S)∪
min(2, S) ⊆ min(1⊕2, S)
Proof:
(a) From (PAR⊕) to (SB⊕): Assume that x ≺1⊕2 y for every x ∈ S
c,
y ∈ S. We must show that min(1, S) ∪ min(2, S) ⊆ min(1⊕2, S).
So assume x ∈ min(1, S) ∪ min(2, S) but, for contradiction, x /∈
min(1⊕2, S). Then y ≺1⊕2 x for some y ∈ S. From the latter, by
(PAR⊕), we know that z1 ≺1 x for some z1 such that y 1⊕2 z1 and
z2 ≺2 x for some z2 such that y 1⊕2 z2. Given our initial assumption,
we can deduce from y 1⊕2 z1, y 1⊕2 z2 and y ∈ S that z1, z2 ∈ S.
But this, together with z1 ≺1 x and z2 ≺2 x contradicts x ∈ min(1
, S) ∪min(2, S). Hence x ∈ min(1⊕2, S), as required.
(ii) From (SB⊕) to (PAR⊕): Suppose (PAR⊕) does not hold, i.e. ∃x, y,
such that x ≺1⊕2 y and for no z do we have x ∼1⊕2 z and z ≺1 y
(similar reasoning will apply if we replace ≺1 by ≺2 here). We will
show that (SB⊕) fails, i.e. that ∃S ⊆ W , such that x ≺1⊕2 y for every
x ∈ Sc, y ∈ S and min(1, S) ∪min(2, S) * min(1⊕2, S).
Let S = {w | x 1⊕2 w} (so that S
c = {w | w ≺1⊕2 x}). Clearly x ∈ S
and, from x ≺1⊕2 y, we know that y ∈ S but y /∈ min(1⊕2, S). Hence,
to show min(1, S) ∪ min(2, S) * min(1⊕2, S) and therefore that
(SB⊕) fails, it suffices to show y ∈ min(1, S). But if y /∈ min(1, S),
then z ≺1 y for some z ∈ S, i.e. some z, such that x 1⊕2 z. Since
1⊕2 is a TPO we may assume x ∼1⊕2 z. This contradicts our initial
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assumption that for no z do we have x ∼1⊕2 z and z ≺1 y . Hence
y ∈ min(1, S), as required. 
Theorem 3. 1⊕STQ2 ⊒ 1⊕2, for any TPOs 1 and 2, and any combi-
nator ⊕ satisfying (SPU+⊕).
Proof: Let 〈T1, . . . , Tm〉 be the ordered partition corresponding to 1⊕STQ2.
Let 〈S1, . . . , Sn〉 be the ordered partition corresponding to 1⊕2. We must
show that 〈T1, . . . , Tm〉 ⊒ 〈S1, . . . , Sn〉.
If Ti = Si for all i, then we are done. So let i be minimal such that Ti 6= Si.
We must show Si ⊂ Ti. So let y ∈ Si and assume, for contradiction, that y /∈ Ti.
We know that Ti 6= ∅, since, otherwise,
⋃
j<i Tj = W , hence
⋃
j<i Sj = W and
so Si = ∅, contradicting Si 6= Ti. So let x ∈ Ti. Then x ≺1⊕STQ2 y. So,
by (PAR⊕), (i) ∃z1 such that z1 ∼1⊕STQ2 x (i.e. z1 ∈ Ti) and z1 ≺1 y and
(ii) ∃z2 such that z2 ∼1⊕STQ2 x (i.e. z2 ∈ Ti) and z2 ≺2 y. Since ⊕ satisfies
(SPU+⊕), it follows that either z1 ≺1⊕2 y or z2 ≺1⊕2 y. Either way, ∃z ∈ Ti such
that z ≺1⊕2 y. But if z ≺1⊕2 y, then, since y ∈ Si, z ∈
⋃
j<i Sj =
⋃
j<i Tj ,
contradicting z ∈ Ti. Hence y ∈ Ti and so Si ⊂ Ti, as required. 
Proposition 10. Let ⊕ be an arbitrary TeamQueue combinator, let ∗ be an
AGM revision operator and let ÷ be such that Ψ÷A is defined from ∗ via
(Combi) using ⊕. Then, for each i = 1, 2, 3, 4, if ∗ satisfies (Ci∗) then ÷
satisfies (Ci÷).
Proof:
(a) From (C1∗) to (C1
÷
): Let x, y ∈ [[¬A]]. We must show that x Ψ÷A y
iff x Ψ y. Note that from (C1
∗
), we have (1) x Ψ∗¬A y iff x Ψ y.
Regarding the left-to-right direction of the equivalence: Assume (2)
y ≺Ψ x. From (1) and (2), we recover (3) y ≺Ψ∗¬A x. From (2) and
(3), by (SPU⊕), it follows that y ≺Ψ÷A x, as required. Regarding
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the right-to-left-direction: Assume (4) x Ψ y. From (1) and (4), we
recover (5) x Ψ∗¬A y. From (4) and (5), by (WPU⊕), it follows that
x Ψ÷A y, as required.
(b) From (C2∗) to (C2
÷
): Similar proof to the one given in (a).
(c) From (C3∗) to (C3
÷
): Let x ∈ [[¬A]], y ∈ [[A]] and (1) x ≺Ψ y. We
must show that x ≺Ψ÷A y. From (C3
∗
), we recover (2) x ≺Ψ∗¬A y.
From (1) and (2), by (SPU⊕), we then obtain x ≺Ψ÷A y, as required.
(d) From (C4∗) to (C4
÷
): Let x ∈ [[¬A]], y ∈ [[A]] and (1) x Ψ y. We
must show that x Ψ÷A y. From (C4
∗
), we recover (2) x Ψ∗¬A y.
From (1) and (2), by (WPU⊕), we then obtain x Ψ÷A y, as required.

Proposition 11. Let ⊕ be a TeamQueue combinator, let ∗ be an AGM revision
operator and let ÷ be such that Ψ÷A is defined from ∗ via (Combi) using ⊕.
If ∗ satisfies (C1∗) and (C2
∗
) then ÷ satisfies (PFI).
Proof: Assume that ∗ satisfies (C1∗) and (C2
∗
) and let ÷ be the contraction
operator defined from ∗ using a TeamQueue combinator. We saw above, in
Proposition 10 that ÷ will also satisfy (C1÷) and (C2
÷
). The desired result
then immediately follows from the theorem established by Ramachandran et al
(2011, Theorem 1), according to which every contraction function ÷ obtained
from a revision function ∗, such that ÷ and ∗ satisfy HI, satisfies (PFI) if it also
satisfies (C1÷) and (C2
÷
). 
Proposition 12. Let ∗ be any revision operator—such as the natural or re-
strained revision operator—satisfying (C1∗), (C2
∗
), (C4
∗
) and the following
property:
If x, y /∈ min(Ψ, [[A]]) and x ≺Ψ y, then x ≺Ψ∗A y
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Let ÷ be the contraction operator defined from ∗ via (Combi) using ⊕STQ. Then
÷ is the natural contraction operator.
Proof: Recall the definition of natural contraction:
(Def÷N ) x Ψ÷NA y iff
(a) x ∈ min(Ψ, [[¬A]]) ∪min(Ψ,W ), or
(b) x, y /∈ min(Ψ, [[¬A]]) ∪min(Ψ,W ) and x Ψ y
We must show that for any x, y ∈ W and A ∈ L, x Ψ÷A y iff x Ψ÷NA y. We
split into two cases.
(a) Case in which x ∈ min(Ψ, [[¬A]])∪min(Ψ,W ): Then, by the defi-
nitions of ÷N and ÷, we have both x Ψ÷A y and x Ψ÷NA y, so the
desired result holds.
(b) Case in which x /∈ min(Ψ, [[¬A]])∪min(Ψ,W ): Then by definition
of ÷N , x Ψ÷NA y iff both y /∈ min(Ψ, [[¬A]]) ∪ min(Ψ,W ) and
x Ψ y. We now consider each direction of the equivalence to be
demonstrated separately.
(i) From x Ψ÷NA y to x Ψ÷A y: Suppose x Ψ÷NA y, and hence
that both y /∈ min(Ψ, [[¬A]])∪min(Ψ,W ) and x Ψ y. Assume
for reductio that y ≺Ψ÷A x. By (PAR⊕): if y ≺Ψ÷A x, then
there exists z such that z ∼Ψ÷A y and z ≺Ψ x. Since x Ψ y, we
therefore also have z ≺Ψ y. If z /∈ min(Ψ, [[¬A]]), then from the
postulate mentioned in the proposition, we obtain z ≺Ψ∗¬A y and
then z ≺Ψ÷A y by (SPU⊕). Contradiction. Hence we can assume
z ∈ min(Ψ, [[¬A]]). From x Ψ y, y ≺Ψ÷A x and (WPU⊕), we
know that y ≺Ψ∗¬A x. From this, (C2
∗
), (C4
∗
) and x Ψ y,
we obtain y ∈ [[¬A]]. Hence, from z ≺Ψ y and (C1
∗
), we recover
z ≺Ψ∗¬A y and then z ≺Ψ÷A y by (SPU⊕). Contradiction again.
Hence x Ψ÷A y, as required.
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(ii) From x Ψ÷A y to x Ψ÷NA y: Assume that x Ψ÷A y
and, for reductio, that x /∈ min(Ψ, [[¬A]]) ∪ min(Ψ,W ) and
either y ≺Ψ x or y ∈ min(Ψ, [[¬A]]) ∪ min(Ψ,W ). If the lat-
ter holds, then we know that y ∈ min(Ψ÷A,W ), by definition
of ÷. Hence, from this and x Ψ÷A y, we also deduce that
x ∈ min(Ψ, [[¬A]]) ∪ min(Ψ,W ), contradicting the assumption
that x /∈ min(Ψ, [[¬A]]) ∪ min(Ψ,W ). So assume that y /∈
min(Ψ, [[¬A]])∪min(Ψ,W ) and y ≺Ψ x. From the latter and our
assumption that x Ψ÷A y, it follows by (SPU⊕) that x Ψ∗¬A y.
But it also follows from y /∈ min(Ψ, [[¬A]]) ∪ min(Ψ,W ) and
y ≺Ψ x that x, y /∈ min(Ψ, [[¬A]]). We then recover, from the
property mentioned in the proposition, the result that x Ψ y,
contradicting our assumption that y ≺Ψ x. Hence, x Ψ÷NA y,
as required. 
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